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Decomposing changes in competition in the Dutch 
electricity market through the Residual Supply Index 
MACHIEL MULDER1 and LAMBERT SCHOONBEEK2 
 
Abstract 
We propose to assess the influence of a number of events on the degree of competition in 
the Dutch electricity wholesale market over the period 2006-2011 through a 
decomposition method based on the Residual Supply Index. We distinguish regulatory 
market-integration events, firm-level events and changes in the level of residual demand. 
We conclude that market-integration measures to improve competition have been 
effective, but that the changes in residual demand appear to have been equally important. 
Firm-level events have only had a minor impact on the intensity of competition. 
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1. Introduction 
The intensity of competition in markets is generally not constant as competitive 
conditions might change over time. Firms may gain (more) market power by, for 
instance, increasing the heterogeneity of their products, raising consumer switching costs 
or mergers and acquisitions. Market power might also change as a result of investments 
in additional capacity by firms or changes in the level of demand. Moreover, in some 
markets governments implement measures enhancing integration of regional markets into 
larger geographic markets, which might raise the number of competitors and, hence, 
reduce market power (Shapiro, 1989; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). The ultimate net effect 
of these influences determines how competition evolves.  
In order to better understand the development of competition over time, one 
should analyze the relative contribution of factors affecting competitive conditions. In 
this paper we develop a method for this decomposition analysis and apply it to the Dutch 
electricity (wholesale) market. We focus on this market over the period 2006-2011, as 
here a number of events occurred in this period. Several incumbent electricity 
(wholesale) companies have been taken over by foreign competitors, the companies 
changed their generation portfolios, while extension of the cross-border capacity has 
enlarged the relevant geographic market substantially. In addition, the demand for 
electricity decreased as a result of the economic downturn since 2008, while the residual 
demand for the major centralized power companies declined even stronger because of the 
growth in decentralized production resulting in a decreasing share of centralized 
production in the total Dutch electricity generation (CBS, 2012).  
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We propose to assess the relative strength of several influences on competition in 
the Dutch electricity market through a decomposition method based on the Residual 
Supply Index (RSI). The RSI is broadly viewed as an appropriate measure for potential 
market power in electricity markets (Sheffrin, 2002; Bergman, 2005; Twomey et al., 
2005; Swinand et al., 2008; Gianfreda and Grossi, 2012). It can be shown that the RSI is 
related to the Lerner index which more directly measures allocative efficiency (Newbery, 
2009). The Lerner index, however, cannot directly be decomposed into factors which 
contributed to its development as is the case with the RSI. The RSI of firm i is measured 
by the ratio of the aggregate supply capacity remaining in the market after subtracting 
firm i's capacity, relative to total demand. If the RSI of a firm is below 1, that firm is 
needed to meet demand, which makes it a so-called pivotal player. 
Our paper is related to studies which use structural indicators to analyze the 
impact of specific factors on competition. Most of these studies are forward looking, 
formulating scenarios on exogenous events. Küpper et al. (2008), for instance, estimate 
how an expected increase in cross-border transmission capacity would change the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and RSI. To the best of our knowledge our paper is the first 
that applies a backward-looking perspective on competition in electricity markets by 
assessing the impact of all major past events on competition through estimating the 
development of the RSI in a number of counterfactual situations. 
By using hourly data over the period 2006–2011, we are able to determine how 
the different events affected the RSI in the Dutch electricity market in this period. The 
data refer to production levels, capacities and marginal costs of all centralized production 
units in this market (NMa, 2007). After determining the hourly merit order we are able to 
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find the system-marginal plant, i.e. the plant with the highest marginal costs which is 
needed to produce the quantity of electricity demanded by electricity users. For the firm 
owning the system-marginal plant, we calculate the RSI, which we call the ‘market RSI’. 
Next, we determine how this market RSI would have changed if certain events would not 
have happened. We define three types of events: market-integration events, firm-level 
events and changes in the level of residual demand (faced by the major power 
companies). The market-integration events consist of regulatory extensions of the 
relevant geographic market. We focus on the following measures: physical extensions of 
cross-border capacity, market coupling and netting. The firm-level events consist of 
mergers and acquisitions and changes in the plant portfolio of companies. The demand 
events capture not only the development in aggregated domestic demand, but also the 
supply from decentralized generation units. The analysis is conducted for super peak 
hours, as especially during these hours pivotality plays a role (Borenstein et al., 2002). 
Super peak hours are defined as 10 am to 7 pm during working days. 
Keeping all else equal, we find that the impact of the market-integration events in 
the Dutch electricity market on the market RSI was approximately 5 times as big (in 
absolute terms) as the impact of the firm-level events. We further find that another major 
factor behind competition was the decline in the residual demand, which partly resulted 
from the growth in decentralized production.   
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes more 
extensively the events which have taken place in the European electricity market, 
focusing on market integration, firm-level events and developments within demand. 
Section 3 presents the theoretical approach to measure market power, while Section 4 
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describes the events which have taken place in the Dutch electricity market and how we 
measure these events. The results are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Electricity markets 
Electricity markets have a number of characteristics which have to be taken into account 
in order to understand how competition evolves (Tamaschke et al., 2005). The product is 
homogeneous, but in the short and medium term, electricity can hardly be substituted by 
other products, implying that the product market consists only of electricity. More 
particular, as electricity cannot (efficiently) be stored, the product market consists of a 
range of consecutive markets in which supply has to be equal to demand. Generation 
capacity is fixed in the short and medium term because of dynamic constraints on the 
dispatch of power plants, environmental restrictions and the long lead time of 
investments. Especially during super peak hours, capacity constraints may occur affecting 
the intensity of competition (Borenstein et al., 2002). In addition, the relevant geographic 
market depends on the network characteristics, in particular the capacity of connections 
with neighbouring networks. 
Because of these characteristics, the response of supply to changes in demand is 
mainly determined by the merit order of power plants. Plants with relatively high 
marginal costs are only used during super peak hours, while plants having relatively low 
marginal costs can be used for supplying base load. Note that plants with relatively high 
marginal costs need to have relatively low fixed costs in order to be able to generate 
sufficient profits to recoup the investment costs. Plants with relatively low marginal costs 
may have relatively high fixed costs as they are more often dispatched enabling them to 
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generate sufficient compensation for investment costs. As a consequence of the volatile 
demand and rather fixed generation capacity, the tightness of the market as well as the 
positions of individual firms in the merit order change continuously. The position of a 
firm in the merit order and the steepness of the latter influence both the incentive and 
possibility of this firm to withhold generation capacity in order to exercise market power 
and, hence, increase its profits (Green, 2011). 
Until the mid1990s, electricity markets in most European countries where 
characterized by publicly owned, vertically integrated companies operating in isolated 
regions, exempted from competitive pressure. With the introduction of competition, firms 
were often split into network operators (both for transmission and distribution) subject to 
regulatory supervision and commercial electricity companies operating on markets. 
Together with the introduction of competition, the European Commission pursued 
integration of national markets into (regional) European markets. One perceived benefit 
of this integration is that it raises the security of energy supply as a larger variety of 
energy sources becomes available. For electricity specifically holds that connection of 
countries using different generation techniques and having different demand profiles, 
improves productive efficiency. The connection between the Nordic markets and the 
Dutch market (through the NorNed line), for instance, implies that a mainly hydro-driven 
system is coupled with a mainly thermal-driven system, which has a different production 
technique. Integration is also seen as beneficial for competition as it increases the size of 
the relevant geographic markets and possibly also the number of competitors. A number 
of regulatory measures have been taken to realize this integration (EC, 2007). Cross-
border barriers within the EU have been significantly reduced over the past decade 
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through harmonization of trade conditions, extension of physical connections and more 
efficient utilization of existing connections.  
Simultaneously with the process of integrating national markets, a number of 
events happened at the firm level. Green (2006) saw an ‘unprecedented wave’ of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. During 1998-2007, the annual number of mergers and 
acquisitions within the European energy sector increased, while also the average size of 
the deals grew. In this respect 2007 was a striking year as a number of deals between 
major energy firms took place (Leveque and Monturus, 2008). In the beginning, most of 
the deals were domestic, but later on cross-border deals became dominant. Most of the 
mergers and acquisitions between energy firms took place in the United Kingdom, Italy 
and Germany. In the former two countries, privatization was a big trigger of this process, 
while in Germany significant efficiencies could be achieved owing to an industry 
structure which was highly fragmented. Also the Netherlands showed a relatively high 
activity of mergers and acquisitions in the energy industry, where foreign firms acquired 
Dutch firms (Leveque and Monturus, 2008). 
The concentration tendencies on firm level may have reduced the intensity of 
competition in the electricity market. The deals in Germany, for instance, resulted in four 
companies (E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall Europe and EnBW) having about 80% of the 
generation capacity, raising the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to about 2,500 (Brunekreeft 
and Twelemann, 2005) and creating serious concerns about (abuse of) market power 
(Möst and Genoese, 2009; Bundeskartellamt, 2011; Liebau and Ströbele, 2011).  Note, 
however, that the impact of mergers on consumer welfare is not straightforward as 
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efficiency effects might (partly) compensate for negative effects on competition (Morris 
and Oska, 2008; Keller, 2010). 
More recently, electricity markets are affected by a significant growth in 
decentralized generation capacity, in particular renewable generation capacity. Wind-
powered generation has grown strongly in many countries as it is increasingly becoming 
economically attractive, partly because of supporting schemes. This holds in particular 
for Germany, where it has almost doubled to about 25 GW nowadays, but less so for the 
Netherlands (EWEA, 2012). Solar cell capacity has also strongly increased, in particular 
in Germany where it grew from about 3 GW a number of years ago to almost 25 GW in 
2012. This increase in renewable generation capacity reduces the residual demand for the 
conventional power plants. 
 
3. Measuring market power 
In studies of market power in the electricity market, Cournot models are widely used (e.g. 
Borenstein et al., 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Müsgens, 2006; Puller, 2007).  These 
models are in particular useful for short-term analysis when firms face capacity 
constraints (Willems et al., 2009). In order to decompose the development of market 
power we use a measure which is related to this type of model. 
Let us take a market with n electricity firms. Let Ci be the capacity of firm i and 
mci its constant marginal costs, where mc1 ≤  mc2 ≤   …   ≤  mcn.  The system-marginal 
firm (s) denotes the firm with the largest marginal costs (mcs) that is used to meet 
demand.  The standard measure for market power of firm i is the Lerner index Li = (p- 
mci)/p, where p is the market price. The Lerner index measures the intensity of 
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competition by the degree to which price exceeds marginal costs. As a benchmark, we 
first consider perfect competition. The market supply curve (merit order) is then given by 
a piecewise linear step function such that firms with smaller marginal costs are 
dispatched first. The system-marginal firm is determined by the point of intersection of 
the market demand and supply curve. The Lerner index of the system-marginal firm is 
equal to zero, i.e. under perfect competition this firm has no market power.3 We notice 
that the Lerner index of each (capacity-constrained) inframarginal firm with marginal 
costs smaller than mcs is positive. This does not reflect some allocative inefficiency, but 
rather that such a firm can produce more efficiently than the system-marginal firm, i.e. 
with marginal costs below the competitive equilibrium price. Hence, in order to analyze 
market power the Lerner index of the system-marginal firm is relevant. 
Returning to the Cournot case, we recall that in the equilibrium of the standard 
model (without capacity constraints) the Lerner index of firm i can be written as Li = si /ε, 
where si is the market share of firm i and ε the (absolute value of the) elasticity of market 
demand. Hence, the degree of market power of firm i is determined by its market share 
and the elasticity of demand.  The relationship between the Lerner index and market 
share, however, is not straightforward for the electricity industry where market power 
strongly depends on the magnitude of demand, given the non-storability of electricity, 
and the short-term inflexibility of both supply (capacity) and demand (Borenstein et al., 
1999; Willems et al., 2009). Therefore, for this industry it is common to relate the market 
power of a firm to an indicator for its pivotality.  
                                                 
3
 It might happen that the demand curve intersects the supply curve at a point where the latter jumps 
from level mcs to mcs+1. In that case p ε (mcs, mcs+1]. For brevity we disregard that case here. 
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The generally used measure for pivotality is the Residual Supply Index (RSI), 
which was first introduced by Sheffrin (2002) for the Californian electricity market. The 











               (1) 
 
where D is total demand. The RSI is a dimensionless variable as generation capacity is 
measured in MW, while demand is measured in MWh/h. As this indicator is a continuous 
variable, its size indicates the degree of pivotality. The RSIi measures the aggregate 
supply capacity remaining in the market after subtracting firm i's capacity, relative to 
total demand. If the RSIi is below 1, firm i is needed to meet demand, which makes it a 
pivotal player. Usually a value slightly above 1 (e.g. 1.1) is used as a threshold to 
determine whether a firm is pivotal because of the need of reserve margins (Twomey et 
al., 2005). Sheffrin (2002) argues that an electricity market can be viewed as competitive 
if the RSI is not below 1.1 during more than 5% of all hours. The advantage of the RSI 
over other structural indicators is that it takes into account the relative position of a firm 
compared to other producers while also including the magnitude of total demand 
(Twomey et al., 2005; Gianfreda and Grossi, 2012). The RSI, for instance, acknowledges 
the fact that not only large, but also small firms can be pivotal, implying that pivotality is 
not unambiguously related to market shares (Bergman, 2005). For an appropriate 
measurement of the RSI, it is important to control for contractual commitments of a firm. 
Hence, the variable Ci should only measure flexible capacity, i.e. the capacity that can be 
used strategically to exercise market power. Moreover, the RSI should also include the 
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capacity of foreign firms to supply to the market, acknowledging the fact that the relevant 
geographic market can exceed the domestic market (Arnedillo, 2011).  
Newbery (2009) demonstrates that if exactly one firm i is pivotal and all other 
(non-pivotal) firms j ≠  i produce at full capacity, we have    
 
,
11 iRSIiL εε −=                 (2) 
i.e. the Lerner index of the pivotal firm is linearly and negatively related to its RSI.  We 
see that in that case the pivotality of firm i determines its potential to raise price above its 
marginal costs (Bergman, 2005).  Newbery further shows that in the equilibrium of a 
symmetric Cournot oligopoly (where all firms have the same capacity and identical cost 




−≈                 (3) 
 
for all i, i.e. the Lerner index of each firm is approximately linearly and negatively related 
to its RSI. Because of the symmetry in this case, we have Li  = L and RSIi  = RSI for all i.  
Finally, Newbery (2009) also considers an asymmetric oligopoly, where firms have 
different capacities and/or different cost functions, demand is linear and contractual 
commitments are determined endogenously. In that case, in equilibrium, the Lerner index 
of each firm remains linearly and negatively related to its RSI. In this relationship both 
the intercept and coefficient associated with the firm’s RSI are still a decreasing function 
of ε. However, now their magnitudes are firm-specific since they also depend on other 
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factors, in particular the capacities and marginal costs of firms as well as the number of 
firms. 
In our empirical analysis we focus on the residual supply index of the system-
marginal firm (RSIs), which we call the market RSI. This index can be seen as a key 
determinant of the intensity of competition in the electricity market, since it can be 
related to the Lerner index on the system level (Ls). Note, however, that the impact  of the 
market RSI on competition changes if the price elasticity of demand changes. Therefore, 
in our empirical analysis we will check whether our general findings using the market 
RSI are consistent with the development of the  Lerner index Ls. 
In order to determine the effect of specific events on the market RSI, we calculate  
its value for different counterfactuals. To illustrate this, let us write the market RSI in 
period t as 
 
                    (4) 
 
where .)()()( ∑ 1nj sj tCtCtX = −=  In each counterfactual we suppose that specific changes 
have not occurred. First, consider the counterfactual in which X remains at the initial 
level of period t, while D is allowed to move to its level of period t + ∆t. Hence, we 
suppose that the past change in X has not taken place. The difference between the actual 
market RSI in period t + ∆t  and the market RSI under this counterfactual is given by   
 





















We call this difference the basic effect (B) of the change in X, while D is allowed to move 
to its level of period t + ∆t . Next, consider the counterfactual where D stays at the level 
of period t, while X is allowed to move to its level of period t + ∆t. Now  we suppose that 
the past change in D has not taken place. In that case the basic effect of the change in D, 
while X moves to its level of period t + ∆t , reads 
 
           
                           
(6) 
Using this, we obtain the decomposition 
 
             (7) 
where  
                                      (8) 
and 




Hence, the difference between the market RSI in periods t and t + ∆t  can be decomposed 
as the summation of the basic effects (5) and (6) minus a correction term F. The presence 
of F reflects that, contrary to what has been assumed in each of the counterfactuals 
associated with (5) and (6),  X and D in fact have changed simultaneously. Notice that F 
is equal to the difference between the basic effects of the change in X, while D is allowed 
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4. Events in the Dutch electricity market 
We distinguish three types of influences on competition in the Dutch electricity market: 
enlarged connection with other markets, firm-level events (in particular changes in the 
generation portfolio and mergers and acquisitions) and, finally, changes in the magnitude 
of residual demand (which is total demand minus the supply from decentralized 
generation units). Including these three factors, we obtain the following modified formula 








=          (10) 
 
where TC is total domestic (flexible) generation capacity, IC available import capacity, 
TP total domestic production, I import and E export. We define the available import 
capacity as the available transfer capacity, which is equal to total technical capacity  
minus the transmission reliability margin  and minus the  already allocated capacity.  
 
4.1 Market-integration events 
As a part of the broader EU market integration project, the Dutch electricity  market has 
become more integrated with the neighbouring markets. This integration is reflected in 
enlarged cross-border transport capacity. The total size of the technical (nominal) import 
capacity grew from 3.9 GW in 2006 to 5.6 GW in 2011, which is more than 20% of the 
total domestic generation capacity of 26.6 GW (TenneT, 2012a). This increase resulted 
from NorNed, the connection with the Nordic electricity market of 0.7 MW which was 
realized in 2008, and BritNed, the connection with the UK market of 1 GW which was 
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realized in 2011. Fig. 1 depicts the available import capacity (i.e. the capacity which can 
be used for commercial transactions) for each super hour in 2006-2011. The available 
capacity can be below the technical import capacity as a result of loop flows, technical 
disturbances and maintenance activities (TenneT, 2012a). 
Besides these measures directly raising the available cross-border transmission 
capacity, a number of other regulatory measures were taken to increase the efficiency of 
the utilization of the capacity, in particular market coupling and netting. Market coupling 
means that traders which are active in each of the coupled markets (i.e. having 
programme responsibility in each market) are able to submit orders to the commodity 
markets (i.e. power exchanges) without paying attention to the availability of cross-
border capacity. The power exchanges set the clearing price given these orders and the 
available day-ahead transport capacity (Küpper et al., 2008). This allocation scheme of 
cross-border capacity is also referred to as implicit auctioning, compared to the explicit 
auctioning process where traders have to buy transport capacity in advance.   Note that 
market coupling refers to the day-ahead markets only. For monthly and yearly contracts, 
the capacity is still allocated explicitly. In the near future, market coupling will be 
introduced for the intraday markets as well. 
In November 2006, market coupling was introduced in the market with France 
and Belgium (the so-called Trilateral Market Coupling) while in November 2010 market 
coupling was realized on the German-Dutch border. In November 2010, an intermediate 
form of volume coupling was introduced at NorNed, meaning that the traded quantities 
are calculated first, while afterward the prices are calculated. This interim form of market 











Fig. 1. Available import capacity (MW) in the Dutch electricity market, 2006-2011 











Fig. 2. Effect of market coupling and netting on the available import capacity, in % of the 
technical import capacity, in the Dutch electricity market, 2006-2011 (super peak hours). 
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The direct result of market coupling is that the transmission capacity is utilized 
more efficiently  (Küpper et al., 2008; Jullien et al., 2011). A more efficiently used 
transmission line can be viewed as an increase in the available cross-border capacity. We 
estimate the impact of market coupling on the utilization of the cross-border 
infrastructure through the occurrence of inefficient cross-border flows before and after 
market coupling (see Appendix A).  
Another measure which increases the interconnection capacity is netting. With 
netting, the Transmission System Operator (TSO) nets out bidirectional long-term 
contracts. As a result, electricity can be exported or imported commercially, but 
physically it stays in the country where it is generated. This measure effectively increases 
the import capacity available on the day-ahead market by the net size of the bidirectional 
long-term export contracts (see Appendix A).  In November 2008, netting was introduced 
on the connections with Belgium and Germany. On NorNed, netting is not possible as 
here only a short-term market exists, while netting is implemented by making the 
difference between long-term export and import contracts available for short-term trade.  
It appears that the introduction of market coupling on the Dutch-Belgian border 
(November 2006) and Dutch-German border (November 2010) and netting (November 
2008) had a significant impact on the availability of import capacity (Fig. 2). The brief 
decline in 2008 results from the realization of the NorNed line, which increased the total 
amount of import capacity and, hence, reduced the relative effect of market coupling. The 




4.2 Firm-level events 
We distinguish two types of firm-level events: changes in generation portfolio and 
financial deals between firms resulting in mergers and acquisitions. The former type of 
events is taken into account by using time-series data on generation capacity per firm, 
based on data from (NMa, 2007). The same holds for mergers and acquisitions between 
domestic firms. Table 1 shows that the major six firms in the market have different 
portfolios. Some firms have a relatively large number of plants, while others only have 
one or two plants.  
 
Table 1 
Characteristics of plant portfolio per firm in the Dutch electricity market, on average over 
2006-2011. 
 Number of plants Average available 
capacity per plant  
(MW) 
Average maximum 
(technical) capacity per 
plant (MW) 
Firm 1 11 318 382 
Firm 2 14 198 223 
Firm 3 7 216 236 
Firm 4 13 160 258 
Firm 5 1 713 810 
Firm 6 2 257 435 
 
 
Fig. 3 depicts how the generation capacity of the major electricity companies evolved 
over 2006-2011. Most of these firms changed their generation portfolio by investments or 
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divestments: some firms enlarged the generation capacity, while other firms had a stable 
or even declining portfolio. 
During the period that the national markets became more integrated, electricity 
firms became more international as well. Before 2001, the Dutch electricity wholesale 
market was dominated by four large national players: Electriciteitsbedrijf Zuid Holland 
(EZH), Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Amsterdam (UNA), Electriciteits Produktiemaatschappij 
Oost- en Noord-Nederland (EPON), and Electriciteits Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-
Nederland (EPZ). Since then, a restructuring process started resulting in the new Dutch 
companies Essent, Nuon, Eneco and Delta. The former two companies have been taken 
over by the German company RWE and the Swedish company Vattenfall, respectively. 
The German company E.ON and the Belgian company Electrabel also entered the Dutch 











Fig. 3. Generation capacity (GW) per firm in the Dutch electricity market, 2006-2011. 
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The impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions on the market RSI depends 
on the availability of import capacity. If a domestic firm is acquired by a company in a 
neighbouring country, this can be seen as if it obtains access to generation capacity in that 
neighbouring country. The access to that capacity can be restricted by the available 
import capacity. Hence, the import capacity influences the total volume the firm can sell 
at the domestic market, and, hence, the incentives to withhold electricity in order to 
increase spot prices (Gilbert et al., 2002). In the Dutch electricity market  the amount of 
long-term cross-border capacity one firm may obtain was legally constrained at 400 MW 
until 2012 (Elektriciteitswet, 1998). This implies that the effect of a cross-border merger 
on a firm’s capacity was also limited by that constraint. In other words, if a domestic 
electricity company was acquired by a company in a neighboring country, the available 
generation capacity of the new (merged) firm for the domestic market was increased by  
the firm-level constraint on import capacity (which was 400 MW). Notice, however, that 
using cross-border capacity is not free of charge. Therefore, owning generation capacity 
on the other side of the border is not fully equal to having extra capacity in the domestic 
market. 
 
4.3 Changes in residual demand 
Finally, changes in residual demand directly affect the market RSI. The higher the 
residual demand, the more the centralized units are needed which is reflected by a lower 
RSI. The relevant demand can be based on the net load of the Dutch system, which is 
equal to actual domestic generation by the centralized production units plus import minus 
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export. Over the period 2006-2011, the net load on this network shows a declining trend 
(Fig. 4), which can be partly attributed to the general economic downturn after the 











Fig. 4 Residual demand for electricity (MW/h) in the Dutch electricity market, 2006-
2011 (super peak hours). 
 
To some extent, the decline in residual demand is caused by an increase in 
decentralized production: on annual basis, the production by decentralized units increased 
from 31.7 TWh in 2006 to 42.2 TWh in 2011, while the production by the centralized 
units remained about the same  (CBS, 2012). As a result the share of centralized 
generation in total domestic generation decreased from 68% in 2006 to 64% in 2011. The 
demand for electricity also shows a seasonal pattern as electricity is relatively strongly 





The decomposition of the changes in competition in the Dutch electricity market is done 
by defining a number of variants in which we exclude one or more events (Table 2). In 
variant A all events are included, which means that this variant describes the actual 
development of the market RSI. All other variants refer to counterfactuals in which one 
or more events are excluded. For each variant, the market RSI is calculated for each hour 
over the period 2006-2011.4 The differences in the market RSI between variant A and the 
other variants indicate the effect of the respective events.  
The counterfactuals of no market coupling or netting are determined by not 
correcting the physical import capacity for the impact of these regulatory measures (see 
Appendix A). The counterfactual of no NorNed line and no BritNed line is defined as the 
actual available import capacity minus the respective sizes of these lines. As the 
counterfactual of the changes in the generation portfolio, we use the average firm 
capacity in 2006. The counterfactual of the acquisitions of Nuon by Vattenfall and Essent 
by RWE is that the former Dutch companies do not see a rise in access to foreign 
generation capacity which resulted from these events. For the demand events, finally, we 
set the counterfactual by correcting the hourly demand values for the change in the 
average annual values compared to 2006. For instance, if the average 2006-level is x% 
lower than the average 2007 level, we decrease the hourly values in 2007 by x%. 
                                                 
4
 See Appendix B for descriptive statistics of the market RSI per variant per year. Note that variant (I) 
shows some fluctuations in the RSI over time, while this variant does not include any of the three events. 
These fluctuations follow from remaining changes within separate years. 
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Table 2 
Definitions of variants: which events are (not) included? 












A + + + + + + 
B - - + + + + 
C + + - + + + 
D - - - + + + 
E + + + + - + 
F + + + - + + 
G + + + - - + 
H + + + +  + - 
I - - - - - - 




The market-integration events increased the market RSI in 2011 by 0.26, hence they 
reduced the potential market power in the Dutch electricity market (Fig. 5 and Table 3). 
The impact of the  connection with the Nordic power market (the NorNed line) and the 
UK market (the BritNed line) is about equal to the combined impact of market coupling 




Difference of the mean of the market RSI per variant, 2011 (super peak hours). 
Comparison of RSI  Comparison refers to effect of: Mean  St. error t-test 
Market-integration events 
RSI (A) - RSI (B) Market coupling and netting  0.11 0.0003 335 
RSI (A) - RSI (C) NorNed and BritNed  0.15 0.001 112 
RSI (A) - RSI (D) Market coupling, netting, NorNed and BritNed 0.26 0.002 177 
Firm-level events 
RSI (A) - RSI (E) Mergers and acquisitions -0.02 0.0004 -39 
RSI (A) - RSI (F) Changes in generation portfolio  -0.03 0.002 -15 
RSI (A) - RSI (G) Mergers and acquisitions and changes in generation 
portfolio 
-0.05 0.002 -26 
Demand events 
RSI (A) - RSI (H) Changes in average annual level of demand 0.35 0.001 313 
All events 
RSI (A) – RSI (I)  0.52 0.002 199 
Note: the sum of the market-integration events (0.26), firm-level events (-0.05) and demand events (0.35) 
equals 0.56, which is 0.04 higher than the overall effect (0.52). This difference results from the interaction 
between the events (which is F in equation (7)). 
 
The firm-level events had a relatively small impact on the market RSI (Fig. 6 and 
Table 3). On average, the firm-level events reduced the market RSI in 2011 by 0.05. The 
impact of mergers and acquisitions on the RSI is about equal to the impact of changes in 
the size of the generation capacity per firm. In the years 2006–2008, the firm-level events 
hardly had an effect on the market RSI, but in more recent years these events resulted in 
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firms obtaining more market power. This follows from the fact that one major power firm 
increased its generation capacity significantly, while another major firm showed a 
decreasing level of capacity.  
The changes in the residual demand  caused  a relatively large effect on the 
market RSI. (Fig. 7 and Table 3). On average, they raised the market RSI in 2011 by 
0.35. 
 The overall effect of the market-integration, firm-level and demand events is 
shown in Fig. 8. Without these events the market RSI would be 1.03 in 2011, while it 
actually was 1.55 (see Appendix B), which gives an overall effect in 2011 of 0.52. This 
indicates that the intensity of competition has strongly increased. The relative 
contributions of the three types of events can also be seen from the duration curves in 
Fig. 9. The firm-level events have a small downward effect on the market RSI, as the 
duration curve excluding these events (variant G) is above the duration curve including 
all events (variant A). Both the market-integration events and the demand events have a 
strong upwards effect on the market RSI, as the duration curve excluding these events 
(variant D and variant H, respectively) is significantly below the RSI of variant A, which 
includes all events. The duration curve belonging to variant I shows that without each of 












Fig. 5. Effect of market-integration events on the market RSI in the Dutch electricity 











Fig. 6. Effect of firm-level events on the market RSI in the Dutch electricity market,  











Fig. 7. Effect of demand events on the market RSI in the Dutch electricity market,  2006-











Fig. 8. Overall effect of all events on the market RSI in the Dutch electricity market, 











Fig. 9. Duration curves of the market RSI in the Dutch electricity market in five variants, 










Fig. 10. Lerner index of the system-marginal firm in the Dutch electricity market, 2006-
2011  (super peak hours). 
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Because of the relationship between the market RSI and the Lerner index (Ls) of 
the system-marginal firm, the Ls should have declined given the increase in the market 
RSI. In order to check for this, we present Fig. 10. It shows that Ls  has a declining trend. 
The average annual values of this Lerner index in the period 2006-2011 are equal to 0.22, 
0.26, 0.15, 0.19, 0.08, 0.06, respectively. Hence, at the end of this period the average 
annual Lerner index has approached the value which belongs to competitive markets, i.e. 
0. The correlation coefficient between the market RSI and Ls   is equal to  -0.22, which 
confirms the negative relationship between these two variables. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We find that the regulatory market-integration events have more than eliminated 
the negative effects of firm-level events on competition in the Dutch electricity market. 
The latter have only had a minor impact on the intensity of competition, which results 
from the fact that no major mergers between domestic companies have occurred during 
the period of analysis while the plant portfolios stayed relatively stable. Regarding the 
market-integration events we find that the impact of the virtual cross-border extensions 
(market coupling and netting) almost equals the impact of the physical extensions of the 
cross-border grid ( the NorNed line and  BritNed line).  Another important factor behind 
the market RSI appears to be the development of the residual demand. The decrease in 
overall domestic electricity consumption as a result of the economic downturn after the 
outbreak of the financial crisis as well as the increase in decentralized generation have 
reduced the demand for the centralized production units, making them less pivotal. We 
conclude, therefore, that regulatory measures to improve competition in the Dutch 
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electricity market have been effective, but that changes in the residual demand appear to 
be equally important.  
These general findings appear to be consistent with the development of the Lerner 
index of the system-marginal firm. While the market RSI shows an increasing trend 
during the period of analysis, the Lerner index shows a decreasing trend: both 
developments indicate that the intensity of competition in the Dutch electricity market 
has risen. From both the market RSI and Lerner index we conclude that the Dutch 
electricity market has become fairly competitive. Given the intended further increase in 
cross-border capacity and the continuing growth in renewable generation capacity, we 
expect that the intensity of competition in the Dutch market will remain high. 
We conclude that the market RSI is a useful measure for determining with 
hindsight the contribution of the major factors behind the intensity of competition in 
electricity markets. Our findings regarding the relative importance of several factors 
affecting competition helps to determine effective policy measures to improve 
competition in electricity markets. 
In applying this method, one should notice a few caveats. Our decomposition 
method implicitly assumes that the different type of events are not mutually related. This 
assumption holds for some events, such as the development in the residual demand and 
the market-integration events. The firm-level events, however, might to some extent be 
related to the other types of events, insofar they affect the expected profitability of 
investments in power plants, and mergers and acquisitions. Stated differently, if the 
market-integration events would not have taken place, electricity companies might have 
had stronger incentives to extend generation capacity in the Dutch market. Moreover, one 
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should be aware of the fact that increasing interconnection with neighbouring countries 
not necessarily results in more intensive competition, as the precise impact on 
competition also depends on the industry structure and relative magnitude of the 
generation capacity in these countries. 
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Appendix A: Effect of market coupling and netting on the utilization of the import 
capacity 
 
We estimate the impact of market coupling on the utilization of the cross-border 
infrastructure through the occurrence of inefficient cross-border flows before and after 
market coupling. If the import capacity is efficiently utilized, there would be no 
differences in prices on both sides of the border unless the capacity would be fully 















                         (A.1) 
 
where ∆P is the difference between the domestic price of electricity and the price in the 
neighbouring country, I import, IC available import capacity, E export and t the index for 
hours. If ∆P > 0 , import is profitable, export in the opposite direction is not. With 
complete cross-border price arbitrage, exports should be zero while the import capacity 
should be fully utilized, reflected by an e of 1. If, however, import is below the import 
capacity and/or export is positive when ∆P is positive, the cross-border capacity is 
inefficiently used, and the e is below 1. Note that the efficiency of the import capacity is 
only calculated for those hours when the domestic price exceeds the price in the 
neighboring country.  
Fig. A.1 presents the hourly values of e for the Dutch-German border, both before 
and after the introduction of market coupling. It clearly shows that before the introduction 
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of market coupling, in many hours the import capacity was not efficiently used: the APX 











Fig. A.1. Efficiency of the utilization of Dutch-German import capacity, 2006-2011, all 
hours when P(APX) > P(EEX).  
 
We use the average values of e in both periods (i.e. before and after the 
introduction of market coupling) in order to estimate the impact of market coupling on 
the efficiency of the utilization of the import capacity. For each period, this average value 









=              (A.2) 
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where T is the number of hours with a positive price difference per period. Since border-
specific data on import flows is not available for 2006, we are not able to conduct this 
analysis for the impact of the introduction of market coupling on the Dutch-Belgian 
border as here this measure was already introduced in 2006. Therefore we estimate E for 
the Dutch-German border. Here, we find that the average E was 0.63 before the 
introduction of market coupling  and 0.82 afterwards. For each average it holds that the 
corresponding standard error is smaller than 0.01, implying that the two averages differ 
strongly from each other. We apply these values as estimates of the efficiency of the 
utilization of the import capacity with both Germany and Belgium during all hours in the 
respective periods. 
The impact of netting on the available import capacity is estimated through the 
available day-ahead transport capacity. Netting means that this capacity increases by the 
net amount of bidirectional long-term (i.e. monthly and yearly) contracts. According to 
TenneT (2012c), “the available transfer capacity for one day in one direction will be the 
difference between the net transfer capacity (NTC) in this direction and the difference 
between the long term (yearly and monthly) total nominated value in this direction and 
the long term (yearly and monthly) total nominated value in the other direction.”  
Because data on the nominated long-term capacity is not published, we use data 
on the available short-term capacity. For the Dutch-Belgian border the data is available 
since November 2006, but for the Dutch-German border only since November 2009. As 
netting has been introduced in November 2008 on both borders, we use the data on the 
Dutch-Belgian border from TenneT (2012c). It appears that before the introduction of 
netting, the available day-ahead capacity was on average 79% of the total import 
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capacity. Afterwards, the day-ahead capacity was on average 102% compared to the total 
import capacity. For each average it holds that the corresponding standard error is smaller 
than 1%, implying that the two averages differ strongly from each other. We apply these 
values as estimates of the impact of netting on the available import capacity with both 
Germany and Belgium during all hours in the respective periods. 
The available import capacity (IC*) after taking into account market coupling and 
netting can now be calculated as follows: 
 
,... ICICEIC βα +=∗            (A.3) 
 
where α is the ratio of day-ahead capacity and total import capacity, and β is the share of 
long-term capacity in total import capacity. The value of β is equal to 1 minus the share 
of day-ahead capacity before the introduction of netting. 
The size of the available import capacity in the counterfactual of no market 
coupling and netting is determined by using the pre-market-coupling values of E (i.e. 
0.63) and α (i.e. 0.79), respectively. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics of the market RSI in the different variants 
 
Table B.1 
Market RSI per variant per year, 2006-2011, annual average (super peak hours). 
Year RSI(A) RSI(B) RSI(C) RSI(D) RSI(E) RSI(F) RSI(G) RSI(H) RSI(I) 
2006 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 
2007 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.02 0.96 0.96 1.03 
2008 1.11 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.11 1.13 1.13 0.97 0.93 
2009 1.26 1.20 1.20 1.14 1.26 1.29 1.29 1.05 0.98 
2010 1.28 1.21 1.22 1.16 1.28 1.36 1.37 1.08 1.06 
2011 1.55 1.44 1.40 1.29 1.57 1.58 1.60 1.20 1.03 
 
Table B.2  
Number of hours the market RSI is below the threshold value of 1.1, per variant per year, 
2006-2011 (super peak hours). 
Year (# hours) RSI(A) RSI(B) RSI(C) RSI(D) RSI(E) RSI(F) RSI(G) RSI(H) RSI(I) 
2006  (2259) 2112 2118 2112 2118 2112 2119 2119 2112  2126 
2007  (2205) 1904 2001 1904 2001 1904 1683 1683 2084  2015 
2008  (2313) 1090 1312   1421 1636 1090 1075 1075 1889  2022 
2009  (2304)   336   543     544   878   332   217   197 1566  1934 
2010  (2322)   165   553     430   975   149     95    48 1604  1563 
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